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Abstract: As scholars and policy makers pay more attention to the environmental impact of economic
activities, more focus has been placed on the corporate environmental responsibility (CER) of family
firms, which accounts for the majority of businesses in both developed and developing countries.
Using a sample of 4714 private enterprises across 23 provinces in China, the current study examines
the effect of family ownership on CER investment, as well as the moderating effects of venture capital
investment and local institutional development. Results show that concentrated family ownership
leads to lower CER spending, however, when venture capital investment comes from developed
markets, the negative relationship is reversed. In addition, the marketization level of the province in
which a family firm is headquartered mitigates the negative relationship between family ownership
and CER investment.
Keywords: corporate environmental responsibility; venture capital; institutional development; family
ownership; emerging market

1. Introduction
The environmental impact of business activities is drawing more attention as scholars and
practitioners assess the interactions between the economy and the natural environment. In emerging
markets that went through significant institutional reforms and saw tremendous economic growth in
the past few decades, one of the key issues under the spotlight revolves around the environmental
impact of economic activities (Aguilera et al. 2007; Nekhili et al. 2017). In particular, more focus has
been placed on the corporate environmental responsibility (CER) of family businesses, which accounts
for the majority of businesses in both developed and developing countries. In the largest emerging
market, China, 85% of all private enterprises are family businesses and more than one-third of publicly
traded companies are family owned (Cai 2015). Therefore, family businesses are extremely important
when exploring firm behaviors regarding CER.
A recent research effort has begun to focus on publicly listed family firms’ CER disclosure
behaviors and environmentally friendly governance practices in developed markets (Campopiano and
Massis 2015; Nekhili et al. 2017; Rees and Rodionova 2015). However, most family firms are privately
held and the internal and external factors that affect the actual amount spent on CER need further
investigation, especially in large developing markets, given the environmental crises observed in China
and India. From a resource perspective (Arora and Dharwadkar 2011), private family firms may not
have the management and financial resources to invest in non-essential activities, taking on voluntary
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environment-friendly initiatives assumes unnecessary economic risk that do not guarantee higher
returns. Family firms also tend to prioritize business activities that bring in steady cashflow to ensure
high dividend payments (Kappes and Schmid 2013), whereas CER spending is viewed as less important
because private family firms are less visible, the reputational risks are lower. In addition, family
businesses are usually less formalized; this is especially true prior to initial public offerings (IPOs).
It is likely that most private family firms do not have a formal code of ethics regarding environmental
responsibility. Overall, private family firms are less likely to voluntarily invest in CER initiatives when
ownership is tightly held within the founding family. The current study attempts to fill a gap in the
literature by directly examining the effect of family ownership on CER investment in private family
firms from a large emerging market.
Although exploring family ownership by looking internally is likely to be fruitful, what happens
when external investors come into play? Can foreign venture capital involvement shift family
firms’ priorities regarding CER and in turn alter their investment decisions? We argue that when
family firms welcome venture capital from developed economies with more stable institutional
environment into their ownership structure, CER decisions will be influenced. Developed economies
have much higher standards when it comes to CER. When venture capital investments come from
a more development market, a new set of norms and guidelines on CER related issues will be
put into place. As foreign venture capitals increase in ownership, they will have more impact on
family firms’ decision making. Overall, having venture capital involvement from developed markets
represent opportunities for global expansion, the increased competition in the global arena is likely to
pressure family firms to improve their CER spending. In the current study, we address a gap in the
literature by examining the effect of foreign venture capital involvement on the relationship between
family ownership and CER investment. Furthermore, we examine how differences in institutional
environment can have differentiated effects on firms’ CER activities. From an institutional perspective
(Ioannou and Serafeim 2012), firms are constantly influenced by the institutional environment under
which they operate. While private family firms may not have formal codes of conduct regarding
environmental protection, a higher level of marketization in the local institutional environment may
very well provide the support and pressure needed to push for more CER investment. This study
aims to explore whether and how the institutional environment affects the relationship between family
ownership and CER investment.
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. We offer insights to the literature on
corporate environmental responsibility by examining the effect of family business ownership on
environmental investment decisions. We argue that tighter family control leads to more firm activities
that focus on individual benefits. When there are few external stakeholders involved in management
and governance, the reputational and ethical pressure for environmental responsibility is less intense.
On the other hand, when external shareholders such as venture capitalists have significant ownership,
the pressure increases, thus CER investment goes up. This effect is especially salient when venture
investments come from more developed economies that have more vigorous CER related standards
and regulations. We also answer the call for research on family business ethics by adapting the
agency-stakeholder perspective. We show that family business ownership has a nuanced relationship
with CER when venture capitals become internal stakeholders, which improves family owners’ ability
to pay attention to external stakeholders. Furthermore, we contribute to the growing body of literature
that focuses on the institutional environment and its effect on firm behaviors. Family firms often
look to their local business community to assess their standards of conduct and determine behavioral
norms, when the marketization level of a firm’s local environment goes up, the norms of CER
spending improves. Family firms that operate in more developed institutional environment will thus
receive more support to participate in CER activities and be more closely monitored when making
CER-related decisions.
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2. Theory Development and Hypotheses
A review of the literature on CER in family firms reveals that scholars have only recently started
to focus on factors that affect family firms’ reporting and spending on environmental initiatives
(Campopiano and Massis 2015; De Massis et al. 2012). Much of the existing literature focuses on family
firms’ collective good citizen behaviors such as corporate social responsibility (CSR) and environmental,
social, and governance (ESG) performance. One group of study examines the differentiated CSR
behaviors in family firms with varied value systems and how values influence CSR orientations (Déniz
and Suárez 2005; Uhlaner et al. 2004). The importance of value systems regarding CSR decisions are also
dependent on the surrounding business community (Niehm et al. 2008) as well as the maturity of the
firm (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007). Family firms that maintain tight governance control and are relatively
young do not have much concern for their reputation regarding their social and environmental
responsibility, and they do not perceive reputation loss as a big threat due to low visibility (Ding and
Wu 2014). Empirical evidence from 3893 firms across 36 countries show that firms with higher family
ownership performed worse on CSR indicators on environmental, social, and governance rankings
mainly because families in control have very long-term stakes and social/environmental spending may
not bring personal benefits (Rees and Rodionova 2015). Another set of studies focuses on comparing
family versus non-family firms in terms of CSR behaviors. Some recent findings suggest that family
firms primarily make strategic decisions that prioritize family-centered goals and values (Kotlar and
Massis 2013), CSR performance is largely influenced by the overall socio-emotional wealth of the family
firm (Yu et al. 2015) and the need to perpetuate the family dynasty through intra-family succession
often overshadows the prosperity and well-being of stakeholders outside of the family (Bertrand and
Schoar 2006; Donckels and Frohlich 1991).
The vast majority of existing studies in the literature are based on publicly listed family
firms in developed markets. Some recent studies have focused on the application of the common
assessment framework (CAF), which is commonly used in European quality management for the
public sector (Popescu et al. 2017), to inform the best practices for investment, performance, and
environmental impact. Others have explored the effect of the 2015 United Nations General Assembly
Agenda for environmentally sustainable development in European firms (Assimakopoulos et al. 2020;
Szopik-Depczyńska et al. 2018). Although listed firms provide more readily available information
regarding CSR reporting, ESG performance ranking, and CER spending, it is likely that the visibility of
being a listed firm has significant influence. In addition, developed markets tend to have more formal
codes and regulations regarding environmental impact, the differences in CER are often driven by
changes in laws and the pressure to reach behavioral standards amongst industry rivals. Given that
most family businesses are privately owned and the environmental consequences of business activities
are especially salient in emerging markets, the current study aims to address this research gap and
explore the CER activities of private family firms in a large emerging economy, especially when foreign
venture capital investments come into play, and when there are differentiated levels of institutional
development across regions.
We choose China as our research context because despite recent efforts to curb pollution and improve
environmental management across industries, China remains one of the biggest polluters on all key
metrics. Moreover, there are over 20 million private Chinese family businesses and China has 38% of
global venture spending. We are able to draw on recent studies that examine firm behavior via institutional
contingencies (Shi et al. 2012) to contribute to the growing family business literature and venture capital
literature that focus on the emerging market. Lastly, China has a large number of sub-national regions
(provinces) that exhibit a highly diverse institutional landscape (Shi et al. 2012, 2017). This makes it
possible for us to explore country institutional variance and its effect on family firm CER investment.
2.1. Family Private Ownership and CER Investment
In both developed and developing markets, family ownership is the most common ownership
structure. Family owners tend to be very long term oriented when making investment decisions and
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the governance composition is usually concentrated within the family. According to studies applying
agency theory in the family business context and drawing from the agency-stakeholder perspective
(Hill and Jones 1992), private family firms incur unique agency costs such as inefficient governance,
hiring lower quality agents due to limited labor pool, and paying less attention to external stakeholders
(e.g., environment, community, general public) (Schulze et al. 2001). Since family firms strive to achieve
both financial goals and socio-emotional wealth (SEW), which includes non-economic and emotional
aspirations (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2011), conflict of interests may arise because non-financially driven
goals can cause managers to make irrational decisions that are not beneficial to themselves nor other
stakeholders. This “agency problem with one-self” (Jensen 2001, p. 48) is more prevalent in privately
held family firms because the owners have a tight grip over all key decisions and are able to indulge in
actions based on personal priorities. For example, a family chief executive officer (CEO) may choose
to not participate in initiatives that benefit the environment because he or she would rather use the
money to support a relative’s new venture, even if the environmental initiatives are likely to generate
reputational and long-term cost saving benefits. This type of irrational decision is more common in
privately held family firms because family owners have the urge to satisfy family members’ needs
and have power over the firm’s resources to do so (Lubatkin et al. 2007). The personal-interests
and family-related aspirations often take precedence over other interests, even if they may be better
business decisions, which exacerbates family firms’ self-control problem (Becker and Murphy 1988;
Schulze et al. 2001).
For private family firms, the decision to invest in CER is also influenced by the ethical tendencies
and perceptions of family managers. Regarding ethics in family firms, some argue that family firms can
be less ethical in some ways when compared to other firms (Adams et al. 1996). This view is largely
based on the phenomenon that family firms tend to be much less formalized than other firms, which
means that many family firms do not have a formal code of ethics regarding external stakeholders and
environmental impacts. In the case of private family firms that have undiversified management teams,
the primary aspirations mostly revolve around building socio-emotional wealth and “passing the baton”
to successors found within the family (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007). While many family business owners
are well aware that external professional managers may be better equipped to lead the company to
future prosperity and longevity, the majority of family firms still strongly prefer intra-family succession
plans (Casson 1999; Schulze et al. 2001). Some argue that many ethical violations in family businesses
stem from nepotism and an overall lack of professionalism, which fosters self-interested organizational
climate (Gallo 1998; Duh et al. 2010). Coupled with low visibility and minimal need for obtaining
consensus and approval amongst external stakeholders, private family firms are likely to have more
concerns for the well-being of the family members personal benefits and the firm’s essential needs,
especially when CER related investments are not perceived to generate tangible returns.
In particular, family firms with ownership structure that is heavily concentrated within the family
will exhibit more self-focused behaviors and ignore investments that do not bring personal benefits (Rees
and Rodionova 2015). High family ownership also indicates that there is a lack of managerial diversity
and the key decision makers are likely to have consensus regarding using firm resources mostly for
family centric needs. With limited external pressure and information, private firms with high family
ownership are less attuned to the behavioral norms and CER standards in other firms in the greater
business community. Business decisions that put their own family members’ personal interests first in
this type of situation are more justified and perhaps deemed more ethical, compared to investing in the
well-being of the external environment, which is often far removed from the most essential needs of
the inner circle. Family firms that maintain their ownership are also more likely to perceive a lack of
managerial and financial resources to waste on non-essential business activities. The focus on preserving
family wealth can also create an echo chamber within local family firm communities, which makes it
difficult for individual firms to accurately assess the cost/benefit of CER investment. These factors all
contribute to roadblocks for promoting investment decisions towards CER. Therefore, we argue that
private family firms tend to spend less on CER when ownership is concentrated within the family.
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Hypothesis 1. The percentage of family ownership is negatively related to CER investment.
2.2. Effect of Foreign Venture Capital on Family Private Ownership and CER
Although family ownership is arguably one of the most important factors that influence family
firm investment decisions, many firms do not consistently maintain full ownership. In order to obtain
sustainable growth and further product development, many family firms turn to venture capital
and private equity investments for the added financial and managerial resources. From a family
firm’s perspective, outside investors provide concrete solutions to funding issues revolving growth
plans, acquisition intentions, succession, and preservation of independence from bigger players in
the industry (Corbetta 1995; Dawson 2011). However, when outside investors become involved, the
family no longer has complete control over the governance and decision making of the firm. Existing
literature shows that institutional investors play a key role in driving socially and environmentally
responsible behaviors in invested firms (Li et al. 2020). When firms receive investments from foreign
investors with strong CSR norms, their own subsequent social performance are likely to improve
(Dyck et al. 2019). Therefore, a key research question arises: Does the presence of outside investor
alter private family firms’ investment decisions regarding CER? To answer this question, it is crucial
to examine the outside investors’ effect on family firm ownership dynamics and the institutional
standards regarding CER from the investor’s host country. The current study focuses on foreign
venture capital investments from developed markets.
When venture capital investments dilute the dominance of family ownership, the concentration of
family decision power inevitably decreases. Family firms with concentrated equity pay more attention
to internal stakeholders than regulatory and market stakeholders when it comes to environmental
management (Huang et al. 2009). With the addition of foreign venture capital investments, external CER
pressure from consumers, competitors, regulatory agencies, and environmental protection laws will become
more salient. Venture capital institutions also provide valuable guidance on good governance practices and
often help family firms implement monitoring and advising mechanisms such as board of directors, audit
committees, and third-party review processes. These governance strategies alleviate the issue of “agency
problem with one-self” (Jensen 2001, p. 48) by providing managerial expertise and formal governance
structure to prevent family managers from making irrational and self-serving business decisions.
In addition to improving managerial diversity, venture capital investments, especially when
coming from developed markets, often set new norms and baselines for CER related issues. In a
large emerging market like China, there has been unparalleled levels of economic expansion in the
past two decades. Unfortunately, the rapid economic growth has been accompanied by a concerning
level of pollution, making China one of the largest polluters in the world. Compared to developed
economies, China does not have a very high standard when it comes to controlling pollution in newly
built industrial plants. Evidence suggests that foreign owned manufacturing firms in China exhibit
less pollutant emissions than wholly owned Chinese firms (Jiang et al. 2014). Foreign enterprises
from developed markets tend to use cleaner energy and invest more on energy efficiency (Harrison
and Eskeland 2003), and they worry more about reputational risks associated with environmental
management (Wang and Jin 2002). Therefore, it is possible that venture capitalists from developed
markets will have a similar impact on family firms in China, insofar that they are likely to provide more
advanced environmental management expertise, as well as enforce an elevated level of CER standards.
Venture capitalists from developed markets represent opportunities for global expansion and next level
growth, the increased level of competition in the global arena will place more pressure on family firms
to raise their bar on CER initiatives. By taking on venture capital investment from developed markets,
private family firms must adapt to the international behavioral norms when it comes to CER. Having
concentrated family ownership in this situation will actually push top managers to pay extra attention
to CER and more easily make concerted efforts towards CER initiatives. Therefore, we argue that not
only do venture capital investments improve CER investment, the prevalence of foreign investments
will drastically mitigate the negative relationship between family ownership and CER spending.
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Hypothesis 2. Foreign venture capital investment from developed markets negatively moderates the negative
relationship between family ownership and CER investment.
2.3. Impact of Institutional Environment on Family Ownership and CER
Although examining the effect of venture capital investment from developed markets can shed
light on how CER standards from foreign institutions can influence family businesses in an emerging
market like China, it is important to take a closer look at the potential variance in institutional
environment within China. One key characteristic of the Chinese institutional environment that
differs from developed markets lies in its lack of consistency and stability. In particular, for the
past two decades, China has undergone drastic marketization efforts, and local governments are
adapting to the open market trend at different paces. The CER standards around China vary
across provinces and the regulatory framework around the country have improved at different rates
(Shi et al. 2017). Consequently, some provinces have more comprehensive institutional support and
stricter monitoring mechanism in place for CER-related issues. For example, the rapid increase in
urbanization in China is inevitably matched by drastic increase in energy demand, especially in the
northern region. Energy efficiency and pollution standards are difficult to reach for many family
firms (Yin et al. 2020). The ability for firms to make CER investments is often constrained by the level
of support provided by the local governments, as well as financial incentives in the form of grants
and tax benefits. A similar phenomenon is observed in developing countries in Europe, where firms
operate in environmentally sustainable manners if they have the financial literacy and receive sufficient
institutional support (Popescu and Popescu 2019). Therefore, the differentiated levels of institutional
development across China add to the complexity and uniqueness of family firms’ CER behaviors.
The Chinese context of our study is both timely and important. Answering the call for context driven
business research that shifts away from assuming an institutional void (Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau 2009),
and instead focuses on institutional differences within an emerging market (Shi et al. 2017). Examining
the relationship between family ownership and CER investment must consider the external institutional
environment as a contingency mechanism in a large, dynamic emerging economy such as China.
Our study examines the contingent effect of family ownership on CER decisions under different levels of
sub-national marketization, which is one of the most important characteristics in an emerging economy
(Davies and Walters 2004; Fan et al. 2007). The differentiated marketization levels between provinces
across China provide an opportunity to examine the effect of the external institutional environment on
shaping family firms’ CER activities. This is only possible in large emerging economies that has tens of
millions of family businesses while exhibiting observable variances in institutional development.
Marketization is defined as the process of transforming a national economy into a market-oriented
economy (Fan et al. 2007). Although scholars have traditionally focused on cross-country differences
(Coughlin et al. 1991), sub-national or within-country institutional differences has become a topic
of interest in recent business literature (Chan et al. 2010). Although large developed economies
such as the United States have sub-national institutional differences (Shaver and Flyer 2000), these
differences are much more noticeable and idiosyncratic in large emerging economies (Chan et al. 2010).
When a family firm is headquartered in a province with higher degrees of marketization, the local
government and surrounding institutions are much more likely to provide guidance and supports
when it comes to CER initiatives. In many cases, there are more regulations that force both private and
public enterprises to comply with industry standards regarding to minimizing impact to the natural
environment. The behavioral norms within the family firm communities will also have an elevated
level of recognition and acknowledgement regarding the necessity of CER investment. Although
private family firms with tight ownership control still have all the decision power, in provinces with a
high level of marketization, the attention on environmental issues are more salient and the regulatory
institutions are more competent in monitoring and controlling CER related behaviors. Therefore,
we argue that the institutional environment plays a key role in understanding the relationship between
family ownership and CER decisions.
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Hypothesis 3. The marketization level of the province in which the family firm is headquartered negatively
moderates the negative relationship between family ownership and CER investment.
3. Methods
Sample and Data
The data we used in this study consists of privately held family firms in China. Two sources were
used to construct the final sample. First, we used data from a survey of Chinese privately-owned
enterprises (POEs) conducted by the privately-owned enterprises research project team (POERPT)
in 2016 (Jia 2014). In this survey, the research team first generated a nationwide random sample
of POEs using multistage stratified sampling across all provinces and industries and then used a
questionnaire to conduct direct interviews with the majority owner of each POE represented in the
sample. The research team members are scholars from a wide range of governmental institutions and
NGOs. The surveys were conducted for an ongoing national project that sought to collect private
sector information to facilitate the Chinese government policy making processes (Jia 2014).
The second source of data focused on sub-national institutional data. We obtained province-level
marketization data from the National Economic Research Institute’s (NERI) index of market
development of Chinese provinces (Fan et al. 2011). The NERI index of marketization captures
the multiple dimensions of institutional reform across provinces and years. The dimensions include:
(1) business-government interfaces; (2) development of private firms; (3) development of product
markets; (4) development of factor markets; and (5) development of market and legal intermediaries.
The two databases included in the current research are commonly used in prior research on
Chinese firms (Fan et al. 2011; Jia 2014; Sun et al. 2016). The final sample of 4714 observations comprises
of private firms from 23 provinces in China. The CEOs of these private firms were on average 46 years
old and Firm age ranged from 1 to 43 years.
4. Measures
4.1. Dependent Variable: Corporate Environmental Rresponsibility Investment
Following the research of Lin et al. (2007), we considered anti-pollution investment as the key
indicator of CER investment. Thus, we used the firm’s investment amount on anti-pollution to measure
CER investment.
4.2. Independent Variable: Family Ownership
We used the percentage of stock owned by family members to measure family ownership
(Anderson and Reeb 2003), with a larger value indicating greater family ownership interests in the
firm (Wang 2006).
4.3. Moderating Variables
4.3.1. Foreign Venture Capital
Different from previous studies only used dummy variable to measure foreign venture capital
(e.g., Pruthi et al. 2003), we used the ratio of foreign venture capital to measure foreign venture capital
to address the differences among foreign venture capital firms.
4.3.2. Marketization Level
We used the NERI index of marketization in Chinese provinces to measure the quality of regional
marketization level (Fan et al. 2011). This index has been established by NERI for more than a decade
and is widely utilized by previous scholars to examine China’s regional institutions (Shi et al. 2017).
The NERI index examines the quality of market-supporting institutions in different Chinese provinces
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with five dimensions including market intermediaries and legal environment, product market, the factor
market, the development of the private economy, and also the relationship between the government
and market (Sun et al. 2016). An overall NERI index is calculated by a weighted average of the scores
in the five dimensions. Following the research (Sun et al. 2016), we matched the index with sample
firms in the provinces in which they were located.
4.4. Control Variables
We also included control variables in our model, including firm-level variables (i.e., age,
size, political ties, and sales performance) and the CEOs’ demographic variables (i.e., gender,
age, and education level). For firm-level variables, we measured firm size with the logarithm of
the number of employees (Guthrie and Olian 1991). We also included firm sales performance,
measured by the volume of annual sales. We also controlled firm’s political ties, which reflects a firm’s
institutional pressure to conduct CER. Following prior studies on firm-level political ties (Li et al. 2008;
Shi et al. 2014), we measure a firm’s political ties as a dummy variable. We coded “1” if current CEO is
a member of the Chinese Communist Party and “0” otherwise. We also controlled for the demographic
variables of the incumbent CEOs, including age, gender (Harveston et al. 1997), education level, and
study abroad experiences. We controlled for the effects of the CEO’s study abroad experience because
research has indicated that CEO’s international experiences affect corporate social performance (Slater
and Dixon-Fowler 2009).
To address the potential endogeneity problem driven by unobservable CEO and family
characteristics, we have controlled for three additional variables in the revised manuscript. First,
we controlled for family firms’ internal succession intention to rule out the influence of family firms’
long-term orientation on CER investment. Family firms that aimed to maintain family control through
successions are more likely to invest in CER due to the influence of long-term orientation (Block 2010;
Block and Wagner 2010). Graafland and Smid (2004) also demonstrated the positive influence of
long-term orientation and CSR. Thus, we believe that the family firm’s internal succession intention
is an appropriate proxy variable of the family firm’s CER orientation. Second, we controlled for the
effects of the CEO’s social status on CER to rule out the influence of CEO’s CER orientation in our
research model. CEOs with high social status may have a high need for attention and praise as well
as a strong desire to have their positive self-views reinforced, which has been shown to affect CEO
decision making such as CER (Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007; Gerstner et al. 2013). We measured
the CEO’s social status by using the MacArthur Scale of subjective social status (1–10 rating scale),
which is a global measure of subjective social status and is related to the individual’s place in the social
hierarchy (Ghaed and Gallo 2007). Finally, we controlled for the effects of brand reputation on CER
to rule out the influence of corporate reputation on foreign investment. The brand reputation of the
company was measured by collecting CEOs’ responses to the following question: “Compared with
competitors in the industry, do you have a brand competitive advantage?”
5. Data Analysis
We performed hierarchical regression analyses to test the hypotheses with SPSS 22.0. To minimize
multicollinearity, family ownership, foreign venture capital, and marketization level were standardized
prior to the regression analyses. We entered the variables into the regression models through four
hierarchical steps: (1) the control variables; (2) the main effect variable: family ownership; (3) the
moderators: foreign venture capital and marketization level; and (4) two-way interaction terms.
The presence of multicollinearity was assessed in each regression model. The values of the variance
inflation factor (VIF) were all below 3.0, which ruled out multicollinearity (Neter et al. 1985).
6. Results
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations among the study variables. Table 2
shows the results of the hierarchical regression analyses. Figure 1 shows the interaction plots of family
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations. CEO: chief executive officer.
Variables

Mean

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1. CEO gender
2. CEO age
3. CEO education level
4. CEO’s foreign study experience
5. CEO’s social status
6. Firm age
7. Firm size
8. Political tie
9. Firm sales
10. Succession intention
11. Brand reputation
12. Family ownership
13. Foreign Venture Capital
14. Marketization level
15. CER investment

0.81
46.39
2.81
0.10
5.85
13.99
196.11
0.27
113.22
0.14
0.18
0.85
0.01
7.44
3.37

0.40
9.49
1.09
0.30
1.90
8.29
1773.80
0.44
3976.30
0.35
0.38
0.28
0.06
1.73
5.43

0.13 **
0.02
0.02
−0.11 **
0.13 **
0.02
0.14 **
−0.04 **
0.05 **
0.05 **
−0.05 **
0.02
0.05 **
0.11 **

−0.19 **
−0.04 **
−0.18 **
0.48 **
0.04 *
0.20 **
0.01
0.28 **
0.06 **
−.06 **
0.05 **
0.10 **
0.18 **

0.19 **
−0.15 **
0.01
0.09 **
0.14 **
0.01
−0.06 **
0.09 **
−0.15 **
0.04 **
0.12 **
0.13 **

−0.12 **
0.03 *
0.07 **
0.03 *
0.01
0.01
0.04 **
−0.04 *
0.02
0.09 **
0.07 **

−0.27 **
−0.07 **
−0.18 **
0.01
−0.15 **
−0.12 **
0.05 **
−0.03 **
−0.12 **
−0.25 **

0.08 **
0.17 **
0.02
0.23 **
0.14 **
−0.04 **
0.05 **
0.15 **
0.30 **

0.04 *
0.01
0.03
0.02
−0.07 **
0.04 **
0.06 **
0.11 **

−0.01
0.09 **
0.05 **
−0.10 **
0.03 *
0.04 **
0.19 **

N = 4714; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.

9

0.03 *
−0.01
0.01
−0.01
0.01
0.02

10

0.05 **
0.06 **
0.02
0.06 **
0.15 **

11

12

−0.04 **
0.01
0.01
0.10 **

−0.20 **
−0.04 *
−0.10 **

13

0.03 *
0.15 **

14

0.12 **
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Table 2. Regression model.
Variables
Controls
CEO gender
CEO age
CEO education level
CEO’s foreign study experience
CEO’s social status
Firm age
Firm size
Political tie
Firm sales
Succession intention
Brand reputation
Main effects
Family ownership
Moderator
Foreign Venture Capital
Marketization level
Interaction terms
Family ownership × Foreign Venture Capital
Family ownership × Marketization level
Constant
R square
Adjusted R square
R square change

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

B

SE

B

SE

B

SE

B

SE

0.64 ***
0.02 *
0.50 ***
0.20
−0.39 ***
0.13 ***
0.01 ***
1.14 ***
3.03 × 10−9 *
1.07 ***
0.43 *

0.19
0.01
0.07
0.25
0.04
0.01
0.01
0.18
0.01
0.23
0.20

0.61 **
0.01
0.45 ***
0.20
−0.39 ***
0.13 ***
0.01 ***
1.09 ***
3.06 × 10−9 *
1.16 ***
0.41 *

0.19
0.01
0.07
0.25
0.04
0.01
0.01
0.18
0.01
0.23
0.20

0.59 **
0.01
0.41 ***
0.14
−0.38 ***
0.13 ***
0.01 ***
1.10 ***
3.11 × 10−9 *
1.11 ***
0.45 **

0.19
0.01
0.07
0.25
0.04
0.01
0.01
0.18
0.01
0.23
0.20

0.59 **
0.01
0.42 ***
0.13
−0.37 ***
0.12 ***
0.01 ***
1.09 ***
3.10 × 10−9 *
1.11 ***
0.44 *

0.19
0.01
0.07
0.25
0.04
0.01
0.01
0.18
0.01
0.23
0.20

−0.38 ***

0.08

−0.26 ***

0.08

−0.24 **

0.08

0.77 ***
0.29 ***

0.10
0.08

1.48 ***
0.27 ***

0.34
0.08

0.60

0.28 *
0.16 *
1.21 *

0.13
0.08
0.60

0.45
0.161
0.159
0.161 ***

0.60

0.81

0.60

0.166
0.163
0.004 ***

N = 4714; * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.

1.15 *
0.180
0.178
0.014 ***

0.182
0.179
0.002 *
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Hypothesis 1 proposes that the percentage of family ownership relate negatively to CER investment.
As shown in Table 2, the main effect of family ownership (β = −0.38, p < 0.001) on CER investment is
significant and negative. Thus, the main effect hypothesis is supported.
In terms of the interaction between family ownership and foreign venture capital, we propose that
foreign venture capital will negatively moderate the negative relationship between family ownership
and CER investment (Hypothesis 2). The interaction term family ownership × foreign venture capital
in Table 2 in model 4 is significant and positive (β = 0.28, p < 0.05), so Hypothesis 2 is supported.
Hypothesis 3 proposes that marketization level negatively moderate the negative effects of family
ownership on CER investment. The interaction term family ownership × marketization level in Table 2
in model 4 is marginally significant and positive (β = 0.16, p < 0.1), which provides moderate support
for Hypothesis 3.
Recalling results for Hypothesis 2, when family firms have foreign venture investment, family
firms are more likely to invest on CER. To investigate the moderating effect of foreign venture capital,
we generate Figure 1 based on model 4 of Table 2. The interaction plots in Figure 1 suggest that the
ratio of foreign venture capital negatively moderates the relationship between the percentage of family
ownership and CER investment. Figure 1 shows that the negative effects of family ownership on
CER investment is more significant when the foreign venture capital is low. The negative influence of
family ownership on CER investment is weakened when the foreign venture capital is high. Therefore,
Hypothesis 2 is strongly supported.
The interaction plots in Figure 2 suggest that the marketization level negatively moderates the
relationship between the percentage of family ownership and CER environment. Hypothesis 3 proposes
that, when the institutional environment is less developed, family firms are less likely to invest on
CER because these firms receive less institutional support and do not feel as much pressure from
their external legal environment regarding CER. Due to weak market-supporting institutions, private
family firms are more likely to rely on political connections and invest money on establishing good
relationships with government rather than green innovation. In a formal and legal environment,
government may also fine those private firms who violate the environmental regulations and encourage
them to invest more on CER, thus weakens the negative effects of family ownership on CER investment.
Figure 2 shows that the negative effects of family ownership on CER investment is more significant
when the marketization level is low. While the negative relationship between family ownership and
CER investment is not reversed, it is weakened when the marketization level is high, which is consistent
with the proposition in Hypothesis 3. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 receives some support.
7. Discussion and Conclusions
Motivated by the call for research on factors that influence family firms’ CER behaviors
(Campopiano and Massis 2015), the current study explores (1) the effect of family ownership on
CER activities in private Chinese family firms and (2) the moderating effect of venture capital
investment from developed markets, as well as (3) the role of institutional development variance
across provinces. Our results show that family ownership is negatively related to CER investments,
which suggests that private family firms with tight ownership control are less likely to spend on CER
when compared to firms with less concentrated ownership structure. Our results also show that when
venture capital investments come in from developed markets, the aforementioned negative relationship
is reversed. This means that when taking on venture capital investment from developed markets,
private family firms must adapt to the international behavioral norms and elevate their CER spending.
Interestingly, our results provide partial support for our proposed moderating effect of marketization
level. Although we see that marketization level negatively moderate the negative effects of family
ownership on CER investment, meaning that family firms headquartered in provinces with higher
marketization level do not invest less in CER when family ownership is high, the effect is approaching
significance (β = 0.16, p < 0.1). This suggests that although the institutional environment plays a key
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role in influencing family firms’ CER initiatives, the external environmental pressure for privately held
firms is not as salient as having investments from developed market venture capitals.
We find strong support (β = 0.28, p < 0.05) for the negative moderating effect on the negative
relationship between family ownership and CER investments when venture capital comes into
play—the relationship is reversed—in that high family ownership leads to more CER spending with
the introduction of venture capital investment. This showcases the strength of having high family
ownership under specific circumstances. In this case, venture capitalists from developed markets
represent opportunities for global expansion and heightened growth potential, and the increased
level of competition in the global arena acts as a wakeup call on family managers to raise their
bar on CER initiatives. When family ownership is concentrated, it is easier for the firm to reach
consensus and follow the venture capital’s lead to increase CER spending. Consistent with the literature
drawing on agency-stakeholder theory, which states that family firms with concentrated ownership
pay more attention to internal stakeholders than regulatory and market stakeholders when it comes to
environmental management (Huang et al. 2009). Once venture capitalists take on equity stake within
the firms, family managers consider them as internal stakeholders. Thus, they pay more attention
towards their advice and suggestions, especially when compared to the marketization influences in
the external institutional environment, which is considered to be external stakeholders and inevitable
placed on the back burner.
The current study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, we offer insights to the
literature on CER by examining the effect of family business ownership on environmental investment
decisions. In a highly concentrated family ownership structure, very few external stakeholders
are involved in management and governance. Moreover, the reputational and ethical pressure for
environmental responsibility not as salient. Introducing shareholders such as venture capitals can
provide a way for private firms to become aware of the needs of external stakeholders such as the
environmental and institutional constituents. This effect is observed when venture capital investments
come from more developed economies that have stricter CER standards and are more compliant
to CER related regulations. Second, we answer the call for research on family business ethics
(Vazquez 2018). In the context of private family firm behaviors regarding environmental responsibility,
this study paves way for future studies to further dissect the relationship between family ownership and
CER decisions. The majority of businesses in the world, both in developed and emerging economies,
are privately owned family enterprises. Although the current study contributes to the school of thought
that family ownership tend to focus on internal stakeholder needs, it is important to note that when
external parties such as foreign venture capitals become involved, concentrated family ownership can
provide the unity and decisiveness needed to quickly adapt to new ethical standards. By adapting
the agency-stakeholder perspective (Hill and Jones 1992), the findings in this study suggest that
private family firms with concentrated ownership are more likely to address the needs of external
stakeholders (i.e., the environment and regulatory agencies) when investors such as venture capitalists
from developed markets become internal stakeholders by taking up equity stakes. Finally, our paper
contributes to the growing body of literature that focuses on the institutional environment and its
effect on firm behaviors. Family firms that operate in more developed institutional environment likely
receive more support to participate in CER activities and are under more pressure to spend more on
CER in general. Our efforts answer the call for more context driven business research by focusing
on an emerging market with the largest number of private family firms that has undergone drastic
institutional changes in recent decades. The findings in this study also shed light on ways to promote
CER spending in privately held family firms. Due to an internal stakeholder bias, institutional support
and regulatory pressure from the business environment is not enough to drastically change family
firms’ CER spending. In addition to continuous marketization efforts, policy makers should foster and
promote foreign investments opportunities, especially for family firms with concentrated ownership.
The findings in this study also have practical implications. As policy makers in emerging markets
contemplate the environmental impact of business activities and create incentives for CER activities, it is
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crucial to pay close attention to the ownership structure of family firms. For wholly privately-owned
domestic family firms, salient operational needs of the owning family are likely to take precedence
over environmental concerns. To induce more participation and compliance in CER, incentives that
highlight both short term and long-term benefits can be useful. The most effective intervention is
to encourage venture capital investments from developed markets to increase the awareness of the
necessity of CER as well as the norm of CER investment in the global arena. Another way to improve
family firm CER investment is to continuously improve the institutional support provided in the
business environment. It is possible that there are firms that wish to focus more on CER initiatives but
are not able to obtain government grants to offset the economic costs. A more developed institutional
environment is more equipped to give support and apply pressure to its local business community to
participate in CER activities.
Limitations and Direction for Future Studies
Our study is not without limitations. Although we identify and quantify venture capital
shareholding from developed markets, we do not have detailed information regarding each investment
and its origin. The venture capitals included in our sample are mostly from Australia, Taiwan, and
Hongkong, while a smaller percentage is from European countries and North America. While these
markets have stricter CER requirements and standards, not all developed markets have the same level
of institutional development and rules regarding CER. We do not know the exact level of institutional
difference when comparing other places to each province in China. Future studies are encouraged to
examine individual venture capital investments and explore the institutional distance between the
investor and the location of the target family firm. This will provide a more nuanced understanding of
how different venture capital investments influence family firm decision making.
Furthermore, our results do not take into account the unobservable CEO/family firm
characteristics that could influence CER investments (Coles and Li 2016). Although we use family
firm long term orientation as a proxy to control for family firm CER orientation (Block 2010;
Block and Wagner 2010) and CEO status as a proxy to control for CEO CER orientation (Chatterjee
and Hambrick 2007; Gerstner et al. 2013), we do not have direct measures on each family firm CEO’s
personal beliefs regarding CER. Since family firm CEOs often command significant personal influence
and have control over all aspects of firm investment decision making process, future research could
delve deeper into CEO beliefs and characteristics to enhance the current research framework. Along
the same line, it is possible that an owning family’s overall attitude toward environmental protection
plays a significant role in attracting investors from developed markets due to the alignment of CER
orientation. Therefore, future studies are encouraged to assess family firm’s belief and propensity
to invest in CER. We also recognize that family firms with higher corporate visibility and stronger
brand reputation may naturally attract more foreign venture investments. While we control for brand
reputation via CEO self-reported assessment vis-a-vis industry rivals, a more objective assessment is
needed. We suggest that future studies further explore the effect of corporate reputation on both CER
investment decisions and foreign investment.
The family firm data collected in this study also does not contain any detailed description of the
compensation structure for executives and family members. While we know that our sampled firms
hold 85% of equity on average, we cannot make any assumptions about the exact equity incentives
for each family CEO. According to the research on managerial compensation (Core and Guay 1999),
achieving an optimal equity incentive level could significantly affect CEO self-interested decision
making. In addition, the current study does not have information regarding the corporate governance
practice/structure of the sampled firms. Since privately held firms are not required to have a formal
governance body (i.e., board of directors), we do not differentiate those that do. It is very likely that
some firms operate and self-regulate in a fashion that is similar to publicly held firms while others do
not have any formal codes or structure. Future studies could shed light on this topic by focusing on the
corporate governance perspective. In particular, how does the existence of monitoring and regulating
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functions affect the relationship between family ownership and CER spending? If foreign venture
capital investments translate to board seats, in addition to shareholding, do their interactions on the
board affect CER activities? Future research is encouraged to conduct comparative studies between
private and public firms both in emerging and developed economies to further examine governance
factors that affect family firm CER decisions. Along these lines, we found evidence that suggests
that good governance practices are more beneficial in non-competitive industries when compared to
competitive industries (Giroud and Mueller 2008). Future studies could contribute to the corporate
governance literature by revisiting the current research framework to explore under what industry
conditions do privately held family firms in emerging markets benefit from good governance.
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